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[To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical.1
Who does not see... [t]hat the same authority which can force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to
any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?2
According to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),3 a union that
obtains the support of a majority of workers in a bargaining unit-even if
that majority is achieved through questionable means-becomes the
exclusive bargaining representative for those workers.4 Unions that
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1. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354 (1948), quoted in Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977).
2. 2 WRrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Hunt ed. 1901), quoted in Abood, 431 U.S. at
235 n.31.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 159-60 (1994).
4. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994). Section 9(a) of the NLRA states,
"[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining."
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
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achieve this broad representational power in collective bargaining have a
duty of fair representation to non-union members.5 The 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments to the NLRA amended section 8(a)(3) to allow the creation of
"agency shops" or "union shops",6 through voluntarily negotiated union
security contracts between a union and an employer.7 Congress' allowance
of negotiated union security agreements was a response to concerns that
"free riders" were reaping the benefits of union representation while
refusing to join the union, and thus were not contributing financially to that
representation.9
5. Although not explicitly required, a duty of fair representation has been implied for
unions acting as exclusive bargaining representatives for specific bargaining units. They are
required "to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward
any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 374 U.S.
335 (1964)).
6. "Under an 'agency shop' arrangement, a union that acts as exclusive bargaining
representative may charge non-union members, who do not have to join the union or pay
union dues, a fee for acting as their bargaining representative." ROBERT GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW 642 (1976), cited with approval in Chicago Teachers Union v.
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 n.10 (1986). "Under a union-shop agreement, an employee must
become a member of the union within a specified period of time after hire and must as a
member pay whatever union dues and fees are uniformly required." Abood, 431 U.S. at 219
n.10. Furthermore, "[u]nder both the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor
Act, '[it is permissible to condition employment upon membership, but membership,
insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon
payment of fees and dues."' Id. at 219 (quoting NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S.
734, 742 (1963)). For the purposes of this article the terms "agency shop" and "union shop"
are used interchangeably because the dollar amounts owed under each are usually the same.
Therefore, this article refers to both union and agency shop agreements as "union security
contracts" or "union security agreements." Union and agency shop fees will be referred to
as "representation fees." The term "union dues" refers to those payments made by full-
fledged union members who participate in union governance and other aspects of union
membership.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). This section creates an exception to the prohibition
against employers using discrimination in terms of employment to encourage or discourage
union membership. It states "nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization...
to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day
following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement,
whichever is the later." Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (using similar language to prohibit
execution of agreements requiring membership in states that prohibit them). It is
interesting, however, that section 14(b) of the NLRA allows individual state legislatures to
nullify section 8(a)(3) by enacting state laws outlawing union security clauses in collective
bargaining agreements.
8. "Free rider" employees were considered by Congress and labor organizations to be
those who obtained the benefits of the union's representation as exclusive bargaining agent
while refusing to join the union and pay union dues. See International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street, 376 U.S. 740, 761 (1961) (citing a speech by George M. Harrison, spokesperson
for the Railway Labor Executives Association).
9. See Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 416 (1976). "Congress' decision
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Because the elimination of so-called "free rider employees" was the
stated goal of Congress in amending section 8(a)(3) to allow union security
agreements, the term "membership" within section 8(a)(3) has been
construed narrowly by the Supreme Court, albeit over union officials'
strenuous objections.'0 This narrow construction has been driven by the
Court's interpretation of section 8(a)(3) as not intending to allow unions to
forcefully discharge employees under union security contracts by unions
for any reason other than a refusal to pay the required representation fees."
The language of section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act 2
(RLA), which allows union security agreements between parties covered
by its jurisdiction, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as materially
identical to section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.13 As a result, decisions in cases
arising under section 2, Eleventh of the RLA have been relied upon by the
Supreme Court as a guide to interpreting section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
14
Despite Supreme Court opinions that span almost thirty years on the
issue,' 5 heated debate continues today over when and how a union should
be allowed to use mandatory dues collected from members and non-
members covered under union security agreements for non-collective
bargaining activities. 6 The participants have primarily struggled over the
question of whether a union's raising and spending of money from its
members for non-collective bargaining purposes should operate on an "opt
in" or an "opt out" system of contributions. In an "opt in" system, the
default position is that employees are not presumed to want to give money
to their union for non-collective bargaining purposes, including political
expenditures. They must instead affirmatively choose to contribute money
to the union for those purposes. In contrast, in an "opt out" system,
employees are assumed to consent to funding non-collective bargaining
union activities and must instead affirmatively "opt out" of that
contribution. Clearly, the default setting of the system is of extreme
importance to those interested in union activism. Under an "opt in" system,
to allow union-security agreements at all reflects its concern that, at least as a matter of
federal law, the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement be allowed to provide that there
be no employees who are getting the benefits of union representation without paying for
them." Id.; see also Elena Matsis, Procedural Rights of Fair Share Objectors After Hudson
and Beck, 6 LAB. LAW. 251, 252 (1990).
10. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (stating
"Membership as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.").
11. See id. at 742,743; see also Abood, 431 U.S. at 219 n.10.
12. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (1994).
13. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988) (stating
"[section] 8(a)(3) and [section] 2, Eleventh are in all material respects identical").
14. See id. at 745-46.
15. See id. at 735; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 376 U.S. 740,745 (1961).
16. See Unprotected Paychecks, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1998, at A18 (discussing the June
2, 1998 ballot referendum on a "paycheck protection" act proposal in California).
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worker apathy and inertia would likely lead to a significant decrease in the
amount of money available to a union for non-collective bargaining
activities like political campaign expenditures. By contrast, the amount of
money that would be available to the union in an "opt out" system would
presumably be greater because worker apathy and inertia would minimize
the number of individuals withdrawing financial support from the union's
non-collective bargaining expenditures.
Today, one of the most talked about issues in the "opt in" versus "opt
out" debate is the emergence of "paycheck protection" acts. Paycheck
protection acts require unions to obtain written permission from workers
before spending worker union dues or agency fees for political purposes.
1 7
Perhaps the most prominent recent paycheck protection act proposal was
California's Proposition 226 ballot initiative, the "Paycheck Protection
Initiative"'8 in 1998. The debate over Proposition 226 resulted in millions
of dollars being pumped into the opposition campaign by union officials to
successfully defeat the initiative.1 9 Because it would have established an
"opt in" system for funding union political expenditures, one of the few
things that both sides of the debate agreed upon during the California
campaign was that the passage of Proposition 226 would significantly harm
the political financing effectiveness of organized labor.20  Similar
arguments have been made frequently during consideration of paycheck
protection type legislation proposals in other fora.2
All is not as it initially appears, however, in the world of paycheck
protection legislation. With apologies to William Shakespeare, "Something
is rotten in the state of Paycheck Protection Debate" once one examines the
methods by which unions have reacted and adapted to both proposed and
enacted paycheck protection style acts.22 Indeed, an examination of the
behavior of labor organizations that have been forced to deal with paycheck
protection style statutory limitations indicates that rather than reducing the
ability of labor unions to extract money from unwilling employees for
political purposes, the typical paycheck protection act will instead increase
the amount of money that unions may raise from workers for political
expenditures without obtaining their written consent.
17. See, e.g., H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997); H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996);
California Proposition 226 (June 2, 1998).
18. See Unprotected Paychecks, supra note 16, at A18.
19. See id.
20. See Michael Antonucci, Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deflection?, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DALY, July 9, 1998, at A28 (hypothesizing about what would have happened had
Proposition 226 passed).
21. See 144 CONG. RaE. H1750 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee); 104 CONG. REc. H1753-54 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Schaffer); see
also 142 CONG. REc. H8462-63 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Clay).
22. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 4.
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Part I of this Comment traces the evolution and current status of
section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act and section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA. It further examines judicial precedent which developed to interpret
the appropriate limitations on the use of non-union member
"representational" fees. Part II examines both the purpose of the typical
paycheck protection act and the arguments usually made supporting and
opposing that act. Part Il utilizes available empirical information to
demonstrate why both sides in the debate are almost certainly wrong in
their assessment of the impact a typical paycheck protection act would have
upon the average employee working under a union security contract and
upon the political effectiveness of labor unions. Part IV argues why
paycheck protection legislation, especially at the state level, cannot be an
effective method for achieving the goals of most paycheck protection
advocates.
I. AN EVOLUTION OF WORKERS' RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER UNION
SECURITY CLAUSES
The two major federal labor statutes that authorize union security
agreements are section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act23 and section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA.24 As noted above, section 9(a) of the NLRA provides
that if a majority of the employees within a bargaining unit vote for a
union, that union shall become the bargaining unit's exclusive bargaining
representative. The union in turn, will have a duty to fairly represent all
employees within the bargaining unit.25
Although the RLA and NLRA regulate different segments of the
national economy,26 the language by which each statute authorizes union
security agreements is "in all material respects identical."27 Despite the fact
23. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
25. See id. § 159(a); see also Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under
the National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in
Beck, 27 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 51, 59 (1990).
26. See 45 U.S.C. § 151; 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
27. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988); see also 45
U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh ("Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any
other statute or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or
carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly
designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the requirements of
this chapter shall be permitted-(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of
continued employment, that within sixty days following the beginning of such employment,
or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become
members of the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, that no such
agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to whom
membership is not available upon the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable
2000]
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that the NLRA preceded the RLA by four years,2' the issue of requiring
non-union members to make financial payments to their unions under a
union security contract first arose under the RLA.
In Railway Employers' Department v. Hanson,29 respondent Hanson, a
non-union member employee of the Union Pacific Railroad Company,
brought suit against the railroad and various labor organizations in the
Nebraska state courts to enjoin the operation of a union security clause that
allegedly violated Nebraska's prohibition on union shops. 30 The unions
relied on section 2, Eleventh's provisions permitting union security
agreements to defend the contested contract.3
The United States Supreme Court originally found that section 2,
Eleventh permitted the level of state action that would be necessary to
support the plaintiffs claim in spite of previous concerns that explicit
preemption of contrary state laws might undermine their position.32 The
Supreme Court ruled that section 2, Eleventh's preemption of state laws to
permit union security contracts, did not violate either the First or Fifth
Amendments and was a valid exercise of Congress' power to ensure
industrial peace under the commerce clause of the Constitution.33 The
Hanson Court further noted that Congress had taken steps to protect
employees' First Amendment rights by explicitly prohibiting the imposition
of any conditions upon membership other than the payment of the uniform
periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments.34 Importantly, the Supreme
Court specifically noted that its Hanson opinion neither answered nor
prejudiced the question of whether union security agreements could be
utilized as a way of requiring employees to financially support the union's
political and other non-collective bargaining activities.35
Five years later the Supreme Court was forced to revisit the question it
had reserved in Hanson. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
36
neither party contested the legality of the union security agreement
authorized under section 2, Eleventh. The question at issue instead was
whether union dues collected under the security agreement could be spent
on political activities over an employee's objection. The initial trial court
to any other member or with respect to employees to whom membership was denied or
terminated for any reason other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues,
initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership.").
28. See 45 U.S.C. § 151; 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
29. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
30. See id. at 227.
31. See id. at 228, 229.
32. See id. at 232.
33. See id. at 233, 238.
34. See id. at 238.
35. See id.
36. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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found that the union had spent portions of the dues collected under the
union security agreement to further political campaigns and support
political candidates whom Street opposed. The court further stated that this
spending was not reasonably necessary for effective collective bargaining
by the union.37 The trial court also found that under these circumstances
this usage of plaintiff respondent's dues violated the First, Fifth, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
3 1
In reaching its decision in Street, the Court first reaffirmed its holding
in Hanson, namely that considered alone, section 2, Eleventh's
authorization of union security agreements constituted a valid exercise of
Congress' authority under the commerce clause and did not violate the First
or Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.39 The Court then paid homage to
the doctrine that, if possible, federal statutes should be interpreted to avoid
questioning their constitutionality, stating:
[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised,
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.
40
The Supreme Court avoided these constitutional issues by explicitly relying
on an interpretation of section 2, Eleventh that it declared to be "entirely
reasonable.",
41
In Street, the Court held that by enacting section 2, Eleventh of the
Railway Labor Act, Congress intended to allow compulsory unionism only
insofar as it forced "employees to share the costs of negotiating and
administering collective agreements, and the costs of the adjustment and
settlement of disputes."42 In the Court's opinion, section 2, Eleventh was
not designed by Congress as a scheme under which unions could force
37. See id. at 746 n.2. The trial court found that:
The funds so exacted from plaintiffs.., by the labor union defendants have
been, and are being, used in substantial amounts by the latter to support the
political campaigns of candidates for the offices of President and Vice President
of the United States, and for the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States, opposed by plaintiffs .... The exaction of moneys from
plaintiffs... is not reasonably necessary to collective bargaining or to
maintaining the existence and position of said union defendants as effective
bargaining agents ....
38. See id at 746 n.3.
39. See id. at 749.
40. Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
41. See id. at 750. Although the Court refused to explicitly base its holdings in Street
and Beck upon constitutional requirements, the analysis in those decisions indicates the
influence of First Amendment values. See id. at 765-70; see also Communication Workers
v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745-46, 755 (1988).
42. Street, 367 U.S. at 764.
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employees to provide money to help support political causes that the
employees opposed.43 To support this interpretation of section 2, Eleventh,
the Supreme Court interpreted the section's legislative history as reflecting
Congress' primary concern with eliminating the problem of "free rider"
employees.44  The Court in Street believed that no legislative history
existed which indicated a congressional intent for section 2, Eleventh to
give unions the authority to force employees working under union security
agreements to provide funds for political causes they opposed.45
The Court in Street next considered various remedies employees
might have against a union engaging in the improper spending of dues and
fees. The Court rejected the possibility of enjoining the enforcement of the
union security agreement,46 or of enjoining the union from engaging in any
political activity using representation fees collected under a union security
agreement.47 The Court concluded by suggesting that two different types of
acceptable remedies existed for employees who objected to financially
supporting the union's political expenditures." One acceptable remedy that
the Street Court believed might be available to a trial court included issuing
a limited injunction regarding the amount of money a union could spend
upon political activities.49 An alternative remedy would be for the trial
court to order restitution to each objecting employee for the portion of his
representation fees which the union had used for political expenditures
despite the employee's notification of dissent.50
Of special noteworthiness is the Street Court's implicit interpretation
of section 2, Eleventh as establishing an "opt out" system for employee
43. See 1d.
44. See id. at 761-64. Also note that if section 2, Eleventh of the RLA is properly
interpreted as a justifiable effort by Congress to eliminate "free riders" it becomes apparent
that neither Congress nor the Court was concerned by the fact that requiring dissenting
employees to financially support a union against their will creates the opposite but
presumably morally equal problem of "forced riders."
45. See id. at 764-69.
46. See id. at 771.
47. The Court believed that such an injunction would have the effect of stifling the First
Amendment rights of the union and those union members and non-members who agreed
with the political activities of the union. See id. at 772, 773.
48. The Court held that these remedies could only be given to those employees who
affirmatively objected to the union's political expenditures stating: "Mhe safeguards of
[section] 2, Eleventh were added for the protection of dissenters' interests, but dissent is not
to be presumed-it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting
employee." Id. at 774.
49. The Court's specific language was that an injunction could be issued "against
expenditure for political causes opposed by each complaining employee of a sum, from
those moneys to be spent by the union for political purposes, which is so much of the
moneys exacted from him as is the proportion of the union's total expenditures made for
such political activities to the union's total budget." Id. at 774-75.
50. See id. at 775.
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funding of union political spending instead of an "opt in" system. This
interpretation is explicitly shown in the Court's statement regarding union
political spending that employee "dissent is not to be presumed-it must
affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee.0
1
The Supreme Court's 1963 opinion in NLRB v. General Motors
Corp.5 2 primarily answered the question of whether employers had a
mandatory duty to bargain over the union's proposed adoption of an agency
shop in states which did not prohibit those agreements under section 14(b)
of the NLRA.53 This decision, however, also provided an early indication
that the Court would interpret the RLA and the NLRA in a similar manner.
Part of the reasoning supporting its holding that General Motors had a
mandatory duty to bargain over the contested union security agreement was
that under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, membership in a union for
employment purposes could only be conditioned upon the payment of the
initiation fees and monthly dues.-4 The Court's interpretation of section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA as imposing such a financial limitation upon the
permissible membership requirements that must be satisfied by employees
under union security agreements is reminiscent of the Court's interpretation
in Hanson of the similarly worded section 2, Eleventh of the RLA.55 The
Supreme Court's practice of interpreting section 2, Eleventh of the RLA
and section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA in a similar manner has remained apparent
throughout its subsequent opinions dealing with union security agreements.
In Railway Clerks v. Allen,56 a section 2, Eleventh RLA union security
agreement case, the Supreme Court refined its view of the procedures a
dissenting employee must take to enforce his right to refrain from
supporting the union's ideological spending. The Court held that the
dissenting employee did not need to specifically identify those political
expenditures that he opposed, but could instead simply object to all
political spending by the union. 7 The Court in Allen also held that the
union, not the dissenting employee, would have the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the proportion of non-allowable union
political expenditures to total union expenditures when determining the size
of the remedy in a union security agreement dispute.58
51. Id. at 774.
52. 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
53. See id. at 735.
54. See id. at 742.
55. See Railway Employees' Dep't. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
56. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
57. See id. at 118. Furthermore, the Court also held that the filing of a lawsuit by a
dissenting employee would serve as adequate notification of a desire not to financially
support union political expenditures. See id. at 119 n.6.
58. The Court believed that "basic considerations of fairness" required this allocation of
the burden of proof since the union possessed the relevant facts and spending records. See
2000]
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The Supreme Court's next consideration of the constitutionality of the
negotiation and enforcement of a union security agreement, was in the
context of public sector employees. Abood v. Detroit Board of Educatio5 9
involved a challenge by Detroit public school teachers to a Michigan
statute authorizing the negotiation of union security agreements for
government employees. 60
Abood and the other plaintiff teachers claimed that enforcement of the
union security clause violated their First Amendment freedom of
61association. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court explicitly
recognized what the Hanson opinion had implied: although union shop
agreements significantly impinged upon a dissenting employee's First
Amendment association right, in certain circumstances, the strong
governmental interests in ensuring labor peace outweighed that
infringement.62 The Court in Abood then held that the infringement on a
dissenting employee's First Amendment right was justified "insofar as the
service charge is used to finance expenditures by the Union for the
purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment."'6  The Court further held that no sufficient legitimate
governmental interest existed, however, that outweighed the infringement
on a dissenting employee's First Amendment rights if she were required to
financially support union political expenditures unrelated to collective
bargaining under a union security agreement.64 The Supreme Court
concluded by reaffirming its holding in Allen that a dissenting employee
merely needs to notify his union that he opposes "ideological expenditures
of any sort that are unrelated to collective bargaining" to invoke his right to
refrain from financially supporting those expenditures. 5
The Supreme Court's next opinion in a union security agreement
id. at 122.
59. 431 U.S. 209 (1976).
60. The language of the Michigan statute was modeled after the language of section 2,
Eleventh of the RLA and of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. See id. at 223-24.
61. See id. at 213. Because the employer was a governmental body, there was no
question that sufficient state action existed to trigger constitutional concerns. See id. at 226.
62. See id. at 225.
63. Id. at 225-26.
64. See id. at 234-37. The Court recognized that due to the inherent nature of public
sector employment and political decision making bodies, it may be difficult at times to draw
the line between union activities aimed at securing a collective bargaining agreement and
those aimed at promoting related ideological causes. The Court, however, felt that such a
line could be drawn based on the factual circumstances of each case. See id.
65. Id. at 241. According to the Court in Abood, to require the dissenting employee to
specifically identify those ideological expenditures which he opposes would place the
employee in the position of relinquishing either his right to withhold financial support of
ideological and political causes to which he objects or his right to maintain his own political
beliefs without public disclosure. See id.
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controversy announced a new test that broadened the realm of union
expenditures which dissenting employees could not be forced to financially
support. In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks,
Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees,66 the plaintiffs
challenged the adequacy of the union's procedure of rebating to dissenting
employees that portion of the representation fees utilized for non-
chargeable political finance expenditures.67 In Ellis the union had adopted
a rebate program under which it collected the entire amount of the
dissenting employee's representation fee, used it for allowable and non-
allowable purposes, and subsequently reimbursed the dissenting employee
for that portion of the representation fee that had been utilized for
objectionable, i.e. non-chargeable, purposes.6' The plaintiffs also
challenged the union's right to require dissenting employees to financially
support six categories of union spending that did not appear politically
motivated on their face.69
In its approach to the case, the Court in Ellis first ruled that a pure
rebate process of the non-chargeable portion of dissenting employees'
representation fees was an inadequate response to the objections of
dissenting employees.70 The Court held that such a rebate scheme, where
the full representation fees were exacted and used before refunding the
portion "that it was not allowed to exact in the first place," 71 allowed the
union to effectively charge dissenting employees for activities which were
beyond the realm of the union's statutory authority.72 The Court also stated
that even if interest was paid on the rebated representation fees, the union
would obtain an "involuntary loan" for purposes opposed by the dissenting
employee.73 The Court in Ellis concluded by holding that where acceptable
alternatives to a rebate plan exist, the union "cannot be allowed to commit
dissenters' funds to improper uses even temporarily."74
Ellis also announced a refined test for the chargeability of challenged
union expenditures. The Ellis test required challenged union expenditures
to be "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the
duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the
66. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
67. See id. at 440.
68. See id. at 440-41.
69. The categories of challenged expenses included "the quadrennial Grand Lodge
convention, litigation not involving the negotiation of agreements or settlement of
grievances, union publications, social activities, death benefits for employees, and general
organizing efforts." Id. at 440.
70. See id. at 443.
71. Id. at 444.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
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employer on labor-management issues."75 Using this test, the Court held
that the following expenses were not reasonably relevant to the union's
collective bargaining activities and thus not chargeable to dissenting
employees: general organizing efforts aimed at employees of other
employers, some forms of litigation involving the union, and finally, union
reporting on similarly objectionable activities such as political outreach on
which the union would not have been able to spend the dissenters' money
anyway.76 Thus, dissenting employees can withhold financial contributions
to union expenditures that are neither political in nature, nor reasonably
incurred for collective bargaining purposes as defined and applied in Ellis.
The Supreme Court again interpreted the requirements imposed upon
union security agreements authorized under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
in the landmark opinion, Communications Workers of America v. Beck.77
The plaintiffs in Beck were non-union employees covered by a union
security agreement between the Communications Workers of America
(CWA) and the American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) and
its subsidiaries. The plaintiffs' claim challenged the use of their
representation fees for purposes other than collective bargaining activities,
including contract administration and grievance adjustment.78  The
plaintiffs specifically complained that the CWA violated its duty of fair
representation under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by utilizing
representation fees to organize employees of other employers, to lobby for
legislation, and to participe in assorted social, charitable, and political
events.
79
In Beck the Court stated that NLRA section 8(a)(3) allowed for the
negotiation of union security agreements between employers and collective
bargaining representatives so long as the "membership required" as a
75. Id. at 448. Union expenditures upheld as authorized by section 2, Eleventh or
section 8(a)(3) under the Ellis test as "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of
performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the
employer on labor-management issues" would become known as expenses that were
"germane to collective bargaining activity." Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507,
519 (1991).
76. See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 450-53. The Court believed that although organization of the
employees of other employers by a union could ultimately have a positive impact upon
members of a bargaining unit, this impact would be too attenuated to sustain forced
financial support. See id. at 451-53. The Court's view regarding organization of other
employers' employees as an objectionable, and therefore non-chargeable activity, has been
criticized as not fully recognizing the role of unions and how a union's success or failure
affects its members. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Wages of Syntax: Why the
Cost of Organizing a Union Firm's Non-Union Competition Should Be Charged to
"Financial Core" Employees, 47 CAT. U. L. REV. 979, 988 (1998).
77. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
78. See id. at 739.
79. See id.
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condition of employment had been "whittled down to its financial core."
80
With that legal framework in mind, the Court viewed the question before it
in Beck as whether Congress intended for section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA to
include an obligation upon dissenting employees "to support union
activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment"'" that together constitute the
"financial core" of union membership.
82
The Court then, as it had hinted at in NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,
applied section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and section 2, Eleventh of the RLA in
a similar manner to questions arising under them. The Beck Court analyzed
the legislative history surrounding the enactment of section 2, Eleventh
before reaching the conclusion that Congress had intended section 2,
Eleventh and section 8(a)(3) to be interpreted in an identical manner.83
This was despite the fact that the enactment of section 8(a)(3) predated
section 2, Eleventh by four years. The Supreme Court majority held that it
was justified in applying its judicial precedent interpreting section 2,
Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act to controversies arising under section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act since the two statutory sections
"are in all material respects identical."84
Indeed, the Court held in Beck that the Street and Ellis decisions
interpreting section 2, Eleventh of the RLA had answered the exact same
question presented before the Court and therefore controlled how NLRA
section 8(a)(3) was to be interpreted in the present controversy. 5 In light
of those decisions, and the Court's analysis of the legislative history of
section 2, Eleventh, the Beck Court held that "[section] 8(a)(3), like its
statutory equivalent, [section] 2, Eleventh of the RLAt'8 6 authorizes the
exaction of only those representation fees and dues "necessary to
'performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in
dealing with the employer on labor-management issues."'8 7
The most important result of the Beck decision was that the rule
80. Id. at 745 (quoting NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734,742 (1963)).
81. Id. at 745.
82. See id.
83. The Court relies on legislative history passages that include congressional
statements to the effect that section 2, Eleventh was intended to extend "to railroad labor the
same rights and privileges of the union shop that are contained in the Taft-Hartley Act." Id.
at 746 & n.4 (quoting 96 CONG. REc. H17055 daily ed. Jan. 1, 1951) (statement of Rep.
Brown and statements by members of the Senate)). The Court viewed the two statutory
sections as sharing the purpose of eliminating free rider employees. See id. at 752-53.
84. The Court read footnote 13 of its previous Ellis decision as describing section 2,
Eleventh and section 8(a)(3) as statutory equivalents. See id. at 745-46 (citing Ellis v.
BRAC, 466 U.S. 435,452 n.13. (1984)).
85. See id at745.
86. Id. at 762.
87. Id. at 762-63 (quoting Ellis, 446 U.S. at 448).
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prohibiting unions from requiring a dissenting employee to financially
support non-collective bargaining activities announced in Street and
expanded in Abood was finally applied to all private sector unions under
the NLRA's jurisdiction. By treating Street as controlling, the Court in
Beck also implicitly accepted and applied Street's "opt out" interpretation
for section 2, Eleventh to section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Thus, Beck
provided a strong indication that previous and future Court decisions
dealing with union security agreements under section 2, Eleventh of the
RLA or section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA would be considered binding
precedent for either statutory section.
In the only Supreme Court opinion on point under either section 2,
Eleventh or section 8(a)(3) handed down after the Beck decision, the Court
in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n 8 announced a three-pronged judicial test
for deciding which expenses a union may legitimately require dissenting
employees to support. Under the Lehnert test, financially chargeable union
expenditures must:
1) be 'germane'to collective-bargaining activity;
2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor
peace and avoiding 'free rider' employees; and
3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is
inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop. 9
The Court in Lehnert held that a public sector union "may not compel its
employees to subsidize legislative lobbying outside the limited context of
contract ratification or implementation. '" 90 The Court, however, did permit
the union local to charge the dissenting employees for their pro rata share
of costs associated with chargeable activities of its state and national
affiliates so long as the subsidized services may reasonably inure to the
benefit of the members of the union local.9'
For the purposes of this Comment, the most important question
remaining unanswered after the Supreme Court's opinions in Street, Abood,
Beck, and Lehnert was whether an employee who wished to pay only for
collective bargaining was entitled to remain a full member of the union.
The Fourth Circuit was the first Circuit Court of Appeals to address this
question directly in Kidwell v. Transportation Communications
International Union.92 The plaintiff in Kidwell argued that her rights under
the RLA as announced by the Supreme Court, prevented a union from
88. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
89. Id. at 519.
90. Id. at 522.
91. See id. at 524.
92. 946 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1991).
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instituting rules requiring employees to resign from the union if they
refused to support financially non-collective bargaining-related union
expenditures.93 The Fourth Circuit held that neither the RLA nor the
judicial precedent establishing the right of employees to refuse financial
support of union political expenditures entitled objecting employees to
retain full union membership with all of its privileges and responsibilities.94
According to the Kidwell Court, the RLA permitted a union to offer every
employee two choices:
1) union membership, and with it, if the union is elected
collective bargaining representative, a right to vote on the
internal delegation of collective bargaining power, the ratification
of the negotiated agreement, and any political or other cause in
which the union by majority vote decides to participate but with
the responsibility for paying complete dues or
2) a non-membership with the right to vote on whether the union
should be the collective bargaining representative and
responsible, if the union is so elected, for paying only the portion
of the dues related to collective bargaining activities.9'
Because Beck announced the proposition that section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
and section 2, Eleventh of the RLA are statutory equivalents,96 it is likely
that the judicial system would reach the same conclusion if an employee
challenged a union under the jurisdiction of the NLRA.
It is clear, therefore, that under the evolving interpretations of section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA and section 2, Eleventh of the RLA, a dissenting
employee working under a union security agreement may refuse to provide
financial support not only to union political expenditures, but also to a wide
variety of activities not germane to collective bargaining that satisfy the
criteria existing in the Street/Beck/Lehnert test. These employee rights will
be referred to as Beck rights in this Comment because the Beck decision
applies to the greatest range of employees.
II. PAYCHECK PROTECTION ACTS: PURPOSE, PROS, AND CONS
One of the most interesting and controversial developments in current
labor law has been the issue of what are called "paycheck protection" acts.
Practically unheard of prior to the Court's decision in Beck, in its wake
these initiatives appeared on the state and federal political scene.97
93. See id. at 287.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 297.
96. See Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 746 (1988); see also
supra text accompanying note 83.
97. See H.R. 2608, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1303,
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Although these bills vary somewhat in language and in specific details
between jurisdictions, they share the common purpose of requiring unions
to obtain written permission from employees prior to using non-union
member representation fees or union member dues for political purposes.
Paycheck protection bills thus attempt to reverse the situation created by
the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation of the RLA and NLRA in
Street and Beck. Paycheck protection acts abolish "opt out" union funding
schemes in which "dissent is not ... presumed"98 in favor of the creation of
"opt in" systems where employees must affirmatively consent to funding
non-collective bargaining union expenditures.
Union officials rely upon three primary arguments to oppose paycheck
protection acts. First, since the Supreme Court's opinions in Street, Abood,
and Beck, employees that object to financially supporting union political
activity already have the legal right to opt out of whatever union dues or
representation fees would be utilized for political expenditures.99 The clear
implication of this claim is that because employees already have the right
to opt out of financially supporting union expenditures, a paycheck
protection act is unnecessary to prevent labor unions from improperly
spending employee dues. Second, paycheck protection opponents claim
that the procedural requirement of obtaining written consent from
employees before spending their union dues or representation fees on
political activities will needlessly impose significant bookkeeping costs
that will hamper union political activities. ' °° Union supporters claim that
these administrative costs are excessive because only a "negligible" number
of employees will object to union political spending.0° Supporters further
suggest that unions already behave responsively when an employee notifies
them of an objection to financially supporting union political expenditures
in order to comply with Street, Abood, and Beck.10 2 Finally, union officials
105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.680
(West 1992) (enacted as Ballot Initiative 134); see also Antonucci, supra note 20, at A28
(speculating on the passage of California's Proposition 226 paycheck protection initiative);
Unprotected Paychecks supra note 16, at A18 (stating that paycheck protection ballot
initiatives are planned for other states).
98. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,774 (1961).
99. See 144 CONG. REc. H1752 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Clay)
[hereinafter Clay].
100. See 142 CONG. REC. H8462 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Clay).
101. See Robert Hunter, Compulsory Union Dues in Michigan, MACKINAC CENTER REP.,
18 (1997) (on file with author).
102. See 142 CONG. REc. H8511 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Kildee)
(claiming that approximately 15,000 members of the American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees will receive refunds for union dues and representation fees spent
on political activities). But see Joseph Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard:
Republicans Take on Labor and the Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes,
35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 347, 361-66 (1998) (describing incidents of threats and harassment
A GOOD POLITICIAN
and their allies contend that paycheck protection acts are nothing more than
disguised attempts to "punish labor for being politically effective in recent
elections."'0 3
Supporters of paycheck protection acts respond with numerous
counter-arguments. They claim that independent polls prove that a vast
majority of workers are unaware of their rights under the Supreme Court's
decisions in Street, Abood, and Beck.14 Advocates for paycheck protection
type legislation also point out that polls consistently indicate that most
employees support requiring labor organizations to obtain written consent
prior to spending union dues and representation fees on non-collective
bargaining expenditures.'0 5
Many supporters of legislation that would ensconce paycheck
protection privileges in the law argue passionately that basic principles
compel the conclusion that it is morally wrong to allow a union to spend an
employee's agency fees or union dues on political activities without the
employee's voluntary, written consent °6 In addition to basic principles of
fairness, many advocates for paycheck protection legislation rely on
observations about political philosophy stated by American luminaries such
as Thomas Jefferson.1 7 Paycheck protection proponents believe that the
moral principles at issue are especially offended by union political
expenditures and activity aimed almost exclusively against Republican
by union representatives against employees refusing to financially support union political
activities).
103. 142 CONG. REc. H1758 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee)
(labeling H.R. 2608, 105th Cong. (1997) a proposed federal paycheck protection style act,
the "Worker Gag Rule"); see also Ralph Z. Hallow, Unions Set to Kill Consent Initiative:
Oppose Ballot on Use of Dues, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997, at A4 (quoting, Judith Barish,
communications director for the California Labor Federation, the state subsidiary of the
AFL-CIO, regarding California's Proposition 226 paycheck protection act proposal).
104. See 142 CONG. REc. H8463 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Harris
Fawell) (stating that in a recent poll 78% of union members were not aware of their rights
under Beck); see also D. Mark Wilson, The Worker Paycheck Fairness Act: Ending the
Involuntary Use of Union Dues, HErrAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 12, 1998, at
1 n.3 (citing a survey indicating that 67% of union members were not aware of the Beck
decision) (on file with the author).
105. See 144 CoNG. REc. H1749 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt)
(citing poll numbers that 80% of union households and 90% of non-union households
support requiring labor organizations to obtain written consent before using union dues and
representation fees for political purposes).
106. See 142 CONG. REc. H8477 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Ballenger)
(stating that basic fairness should not allow the automatic deduction of money from an
employee's paycheck to support political causes the employee opposes).
107. See 144 CoNG. REC. H1752 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Dunn)
("To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which
he disbelieves both sinful and tyrannical" (quoting Thomas Jefferson)); see also Cathleen
Ferraro, Battle over Proposition 226 Gets Under Way, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 20, 1998, at
A4 (discussing potential implications of Proposition 226).
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party candidates l8 when almost thirty percent of union members consider
themselves Republicans and another ten percent of union members identify
themselves as political independents.' ° 9
Finally, supporters of paycheck protection acts frequently claim that
the results of paycheck protection legislation enacted in Washington in
199210 provide empirical support for the assertion that when given a
choice, most employees choose not to financially support union political
expenditures."'
III. WHAT DO THE REAL WORLD NUMBERS SAY ABOUT THE
ARGUMENTS?
The arguments made by supporters and opponents of the acts indicate
that both sides believe that such legislation would almost certainly result in
a reduction in the amount of political monies a union could raise and spend
from union member dues.' However, union behavior in both California
and Washington indicates that paycheck protection legislation, at its best,
will have only a minimal effect upon the amount of union dues and
representation fees available for union political expenditures. At its worst
for employees, the average paycheck protection law will allow unions to
increase the amount of money from union dues and representation fees that
is available for legal political expenditures by a union without employees'
consent.
A. Strike One Against Paycheck Protection Acts: The Failure of the
Washington State Paycheck Protection Ballot Initiative
In a 1992 ballot referendum, seventy-three percent of Washington
State voters approved legislation titled "Initiative 134" that attempted to
establish a state level "opt in" system requiring written consent prior to
union political spending of employee dues and representation fees."' Due
108. See Paycheck Protection: Unions Need Permission to Use Dues for Politics, SAN
DIEGo UNiON-TRIB., Apr. 23, 1998, at B1O ("During the 1995-1996 election cycle, unions
gave $54 million to Democrats and $4 million to Republicans, according to the Center for
Responsive Politics") [hereinafter Paycheck Protection]; see also Knollenberg, supra note
102, at 350 nn.17-18 (discussing Republican push for Beck legislation).
109. See 144 CONG. REc. H1751 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Cunningham); see also Paycheck Protection, supra note 108, at BlO.
110. See sources cited supra note 21.
111. See sources cited supra note 107; see also 144 CONG. REc. H1753-54 (daily ed.
Mar. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Schaffer) [hereinafter Schaffer Statement].
112. See id.; see also Clay, supra note 99.
113. See National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation Press Release, Union Bosses
Richer After Campaign 'Reform' (visited Dec. 23, 1999)
<http://www.nrtw.org/a/I134.htm>. Initiative 134 was incorporated into the Washington
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to Washington's previously enacted statutory definition of the term
"contribution," the initiative automatically excluded from its coverage
"soft" political expenditures such as internal political communications
published by labor organizations and the printing of political messages on
banners and signs for display on private property. 4
For several years prior to the passage of Initiative 134, the
Washington Education Association ("WEA") operated a registered political
committee named Political Unity of Leaders in State Education
("PULSE")." 5 PULSE was supported by the automatic annual deduction of
thirteen dollars from the wages of union members. This was a voluntary
authorization that continued indefinitely until revoked." 6  Non-union
member agency fee contributors did not pay the thirteen-dollar fee to
PULSE. Moreover, each agency fee contributor received an annual rebate
of about $150, as compared to union members paying full union dues."
7
In 1993, the WEA created a group named the "Life After 134 Task
Force" ("Task Force"). The purpose of this group was to make policy
recommendations in reaction to Initiative 134's requirement that employees
annually reauthorize wage deductions utilized for "hard" money
contributions given directly to political candidates."1 As a result of the
Task Force's recommendations, the WEA voted in April 1994 to disband
the PULSE committee as well as all locally registered political committees
and to create a single new registered political committee that would be
known as "WEA-PAC."' 9 At the same time, the WEA voted to create a
revised code as RCW 42.17.680 and in relevant portion states:
No employer or other person or entity responsible for the disbursement of funds
in payment of wages or salaries may withhold or divert a portion of an
employee's wages or salaries for contributions to political committees or for use
as political contributions except upon the written request of the employee. The
request must be made on a form prescribed by the commission informing the
employee of the prohibition against employer and labor organization
discrimination described in subsection (2) of this section. The request is valid
for no more than twelve months from the date it is made by the employee.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.640(3) (West 1998). It is important to note that Initiative
134 also contained numerous campaign regulations affecting a number of areas unrelated to
union dues and the thesis of this Comment.
114. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.020(14) (West 1998) (providing the statutory
definition of "contribution," including interpretative examples that apply to the language of
section 42.17.680 of the Washington Revised Code).
115. See National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, supra note 113.
116. See Settlement Agreement (visited Nov. 2, 1999)
<http:llwww.wa.gov:8Oago/pubs/weasetl.html> para. 2 (outlining the terms of the Feb. 26,
1998 settlement between Washington and the WEA).
117. See Interview with Milton L. Chappell, member of Maryland & District of
Columbia Bar Associations (Sept. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Chappell interview].
118. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 116, factual paras. 7, 12.
119. See id. factual para. 9.
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Community Outreach Program ("COP") which did not qualify under
Washington law as a "political committee" despite its dedication to
"political education.0 20  The political activities of the original PULSE
committee were then divided between WEA-PAC and COP in order to
continue the union's political activities in a manner similar to that before
Initiative 134's enactment.
WEA-PAC restricted its political behavior to what had been PULSE's
"hard" money political expenditures, such as direct union contributions to
candidates, expenditures supporting or opposing specific ballot measures,
etc. 12  Because WEA-PAC was a registered political committee, Initiative
134 required those WEA union members wishing to help fund WEA-PAC
through paycheck deductions to annually authorize those deductions. The
voluntary dues sought from members in support of WEA-PAC consisted of
an additional twelve dollars annually, above and beyond the normal WEA
member union dues.122
Expenditures by COP involved the continuation of activities that could
be described as the "soft" money expenditures of PULSE.'23 The principle
distinction between the "hard" money expenditures of WEA-PAC and the
"soft" money political expenditures of COP is that "hard" money is spent so
that it directly benefits a particular candidate or group and may be spent
under the direction of the beneficiary. "Soft" money, in contrast, is money
spent on activities that indirectly benefit a candidate or political
organization and is not spent under the guidance of the intended
beneficiary. However, anyone familiar with the recurring congressional
debates over proposed federal campaign finance reforms is well aware of
the fact that in practice the line between "hard" money and "soft" money
political expenditures is extremely fuzzy. Examples of the "soft" money
political expenditures that COP could legally carry out without running
120. See id. factual para. 13; see also National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation,
supra note 113.
121. See Chappell interview, supra note 117; see also Settlement Agreement, supra note
116, factual para. 14.
122. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 116, factual para. 11.
123. Several of COP's initial expenditures were challenged in a complaint against the
WEA by the Washington State Attorney. See id. at intro. Some of the challenged COP
expenditures included paying the overhead, fundraising, and other administrative costs of
WEA-PAC. Those expenditures were later determined to be improper "contributions"
without the consent of union members in the settlement agreement between the WEA and
Washington State. See id. conclusory paras. 4, 6. However, other challenged COP political
expenditures were held by the settlement agreement to not meet the statutory definition of
"contributions" requiring the prior written consent of WEA union members. These
expenditures included funding a union newsletter dealing with politics, lobbying of
governmental officials on legislation, and producing and airing what have become known as
"issue ads" with COP funds for direct communication to the public unrelated to a particular
election campaign. See id. conclusory para. 3, Exhibit A Guidelines.
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afoul of Initiative 134 included activities such as issue advertising, political
coverage, editorials in union newspapers, voter turnout drives, and issue
lobbying. These COP political expenditures were funded by a mandatory
assessment of an additional twelve dollars in WEA union member dues.'2a
The financial results of this legal maneuvering by the WEA are easily
calculated. Prior to the disbandment of the PULSE committee, between
48,000 and 49,000 out of a total of 65,00012 WEA union members
authorized the ongoing automatic annual deduction of thirteen dollars,
earmarked for the PULSE committee from their paychecks. 126 The WEA
therefore collected a total of approximately $630,000 in 1993 for PULSE
political expenditures of both "hard" and "soft" campaign funds before the
enactment of Initiative 134.127 After voter approval of Initiative 134 and
the replacement of the PULSE committee with WEA-PAC and COP,
approximately 8,000 WEA members chose to contribute to WEA-PAC.
128
It is that alleged drop (from approximately 48,000 supporters to
approximately 8,000) in the WEA's ability to spend member dues and fees
for union political expenditures, that advocates for both sides in the
paycheck protection debate point to as evidence supporting their
position. 129 After all, if the WEA could only draw upon the dues of the
8,000 members who contributed to WEA-PAC, simple math indicates that
the WEA would only be able to spend approximately $96,000 on political
expenditures.
Both sides fail to take into account, however, the fact that each of the
approximately 65,000 WEA members continues to pay an additional
twelve dollars a year in mandatory union dues to fund COP, which may use
those dues to engage in "soft" money political activity. 30 If one assumes
that there are approximately 65,000 WEA members who each pay twelve
dollars in mandatory union dues to COP annually, the total amount of
124. At the meeting approving the creation of COP, the WEA Representative Assembly
amended the WEA bylaws to adopt Article II, section 2, which provides in relevant part:
"The annual dues of an active member shall include an additional twelve dollars ($12)
annually dedicated to the political education component of the Washington Education
Association." Settlement Agreement, supra note 116, factual para. 11. Thus, the WEA was
able to convert almost all the money it had collected for PULSE as voluntary paycheck
deductions into required payments by mandatory fiat despite Initiative 134.
125. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 116; see also Chappell interview, supra note
117.
126. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 116, factual paras. 2, 3.
127. See id.
128. See Schaffer Statement, supra note 111 (citing this statistic as proof that paycheck
protection acts result in a reduction in the amount of money available for union political
expenditures from union dues and representation fees).
129. See Schaffer Statement, supra note 111; Clay Statement, supra note 99; see also
Chappell interview, supra note 117.
130. See sources cited supra notes 111-12; see also Chappell interview, supra note 117.
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union dues available for political spending by COP is approximately
$780,000. This COP "soft" political money is in addition to the minimum
of $96,000 in union dues available as additional voluntary contributions by
WEA members to WEA-PAC. At a minimum, the WEA may now spend
$876,000 of union member dues for various political expenditures as
opposed to approximately $630,000 under the PULSE regime. Moreover,
because the union retains all of its statutorily granted power to collect
agency dues from dissenting employees, nothing prevents the union from
legally increasing dues to virtually any level it pleases.13 ' Thus, instead of
decreasing the amount of union dues available for political expenditures,
paycheck protection as embodied in Initiative 134 resulted in at least one
major union successfully increasing the amount of money it can spend on
political support without obtaining the consent of its members from
approximately $630,000 to approximately $780,000.
If the empirical results cited above did not utterly discredit arguments
that Initiative 134's paycheck protection legislation has succeeded in
increasing the amount of control union members have over the use of their
union dues for political purposes by their union, then the guidelines that
accompany the settlement agreement prove the ineffectiveness of Initiative
134 beyond a reasonable doubt. The settlement agreement claims that its
accompanying guidelines accurately reflect the view of Washington with
regard to the applicability of Initiative 134 to the use of a union's general
treasury funds for both "hard" and "soft" political activity 32  The
settlement guidelines in relevant portion state:
The PDC [Public Disclosure Commission] is aware that
membership organizations, such as the WEA, collect dues from
their members that go to their general treasury. Such dues are not
collected for specific purposes, are not predesignated and are
intended to generally provide support for the organization ....
Such general treasury funds may be expended as contributions to
candidates and political committees, including affiliated political
committees such as WEA-PAC without creating a political
committee. The PDC interpretation of RCW 42.17.680(3)
[Initiative 134] is that it does not apply to the dues deductions
that generate WEA's general treasury funds because as presently
constituted the WEA is not a political committee .... The
membership organization itself becomes a political committee
only when the pattern of such discretionary expenditures from the
general treasury demonstrate that it has become a primary
purpose of the organization to make contributions, as defined in
131. In the 1998-1999 budget, for example, the WEA union increased its membership
dues by approximately twelve dollars per person across the board. See Chappell interview,
supra note 117.
132. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 116, conclusory paras. 2-3.
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RCW 42.17.020(14), intended to affect the outcome of political
campaigns.1
The conclusion to be drawn from a plain reading of the settlement
guidelines is that Initiative 134 did not even succeed in preventing union
officials from making "hard" money political expenditures of general union
dues and agency fees directly to political candidates without first obtaining
the written approval of employees. Far from being the destructive force
union officials claimed it would be, Initiative 134 has thoroughly failed to
prevent the unauthorized political expenditure of union dues and
representation fees. Unfortunately, the reasons for Initiative 134's
ineffectiveness are endemic to all paycheck protection acts.
B. Strike Two: It's the Principle, Not the Jurisdiction or Statutory
Language
Proponents of paycheck protection acts may rightly claim that if the
language of Initiative 134 had been drafted more clearly, it might have
achieved its goal of granting workers more control over how a union may
spend their union dues or representation fees. For example, the language of
Initiative 134 only expressly applied to those responsible for disbursing an
employee's wages or salaries-the employers1 34 Indeed, Washington's
Public Disclosure Commission's decision holding Initiative 134
inapplicable to political expenditures of general union treasury funds can
be rationalized since Initiative 134 did not expressly forbid unions from
utilizing any portion of union dues or representation fees for political
expenditures without the consent of employees. Unfortunately, for
proponents of paycheck protection acts, the empirical evidence available
from 1998 and the Proposition 226 campaign in California indicates that
even finely tuned legislative language will not succeed in achieving the
goals of paycheck protection advocates.
On June 2, 1998, Californians rejected proposed paycheck protection
ballot initiative, "Proposition 226. 135 Empirical evidence from one of the
proposal's strongest opponents, the California Teachers Association
("CTA"), strongly intimates, however, that like Initiative 134, Proposition
226 would have had only a minimal effect, if any, upon unions wishing to
spend union dues or representation fees for political purposes without
employees' consent. Of course, it is impossible to say with certainty what
Proposition 226 would have accomplished if adopted. This evidence
indicates, however, that labor organization officials can circumvent any
133. Exhibit A: Guidelines (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http://www.wa.govlago/pubs/weaexhibit_a.html>.
134. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.680(3) (West 1998).
135. See Unprotected Paychecks, supra note 16.
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state level paycheck protection act that might be passed in California.
Proposition 226, like Washington's Initiative 134 and other proposed
paycheck protection acts, was promoted by supporters as an attempt to
guarantee a worker's right to make his or her own decision as to which
political ideals he would grant financial support, i.e. an "opt in" system of
funding.136  On the surface, Proposition 226, dubbed the "Campaign
Reform Initiative" ("CR1"), appeared to avoid what was probably Initiative
134's greatest textual weakness by specifically prohibiting both employers
and labor organizations from using any portion of an employee's paycheck,
union dues, or representation fees for political contributions without
obtaining that employee's voluntary written consent. 37 Unfortunately for
the advocates of the principles underlying the concept of paycheck
protection acts, Proposition 226 retained numerous flaws and loopholes for
labor organizations to exploit.
The first pro-union loophole within Proposition 226 was that the
proposed legislation did nothing to alter California's statutory definitions of
"political contributions" or "political expenditures." California's unaltered
statutory definitions of "contributions" or "expenditures" do not include
activities arguably 'nonpartisan' in nature such as voter registration (even if
the union aims a voter registration drive or a "get out the vote" effort solely
at voters who, rightly or wrongly, are believed to be sympathetic to the
union's political positions), issue advertising, and issue lobbying. 3 8
Second, California's statutory definitions do not consider political
expenditures of dues received by unions who have a primary purpose other
than supporting candidates or ballot proposals, e.g. negotiating collective
bargaining contracts, to be political "contributions" unless the union
member knows or has reason to know that the dues will be dedicated to
136. See Ferraro, supra note 107.
137. Chapter 5.9 of the California Government Code would have been amended by the
addition of section 85990 which closely tracked the language of WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
section 42.17.680(3) (Initiative 134), prohibiting employers from deducting money from an
employee's paycheck for political purposes without the employee's consent. More
importantly, section 85991 would also have been added to Chapter 5.9 of the California
Government Code to prohibit labor organizations from using union dues or representation
fees for political contributions without a member's written consent. In its relevant part,
section 85991 stated:
(a) No labor organization shall use any portion of dues, agency shop fees, or any
other fees paid by members of the labor organization, or individuals who are not
members, to make contributions or expenditures except upon the written
authorization of the member, or individual who is not a member, received
within the previous 12 months ....
California Proposition 226 (proposed June 2, 1998) (emphasis added) (on file with the
author).
138. See Chappell interview, supra note 117.
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making political contributions or expenditures.139  Of course, any
expenditure of union dues and agency fees for activities that did not fall
within the statutory definitions of political contributions and political
expenditures would necessarily have been free of Proposition 226's
employee consent requirement.
Evidence that California unions planned on taking advantage of these
textual loopholes to sustain their political involvement while at the same
time vehemently arguing that Proposition 226 would destroy the ability of
labor organizations to remain politically involved surfaced soon after voters
rejected Proposition 226. Perhaps the CTA provided the clearest evidence
of this type of planned union behavior. Prior to the election, the CTA spent
$6.4 million dollars opposing the passage of Proposition 226 as anti-
worker.""' However, copies of tentative CTA budgets obtained and
publicized by Michael Antonucci of the California-based Education
Intelligence Agency demonstrate that during its public campaign against
Proposition 226, the CTA prepared two different budgets. The CTA
apparently prepared one budget for adoption if voters approved Proposition
226, however, if Proposition 226 failed the alternate budget would be
adopted.14' Surprisingly, the financial contents of the alternate budgets
were not what one would expect in light of the CTA's vigorous campaign
against the enactment of Proposition 226.
The CTA spent millions of dollars opposing Proposition 226 because
of the negative effect it would allegedly have upon the ability of unions to
participate effectively in politics. 142  An observer would therefore
reasonably expect the final income and expenditure amounts of the draft
CTA budget prepared with Proposition 226's passage in mind to be lower
than the draft CTA budget prepared under the assumption that Proposition
226 would fail. This difference in the final income and expenditure
amounts should be expected if the enactment of Proposition 226 would
actually have the negative impact on union political finances predicted by
labor unions including the CTA. Such an expectation would have been
incorrect, however, since oddly enough the final amount of budgeted
expenditures in the alternate CTA draft budgets turned out to be
identical!' 43
139. See id.
140. See Unprotected Paychecks, supra note 16; see also Ralph Z. Hallow & Robert S.
McCain, Report of NEA Tells of Plot by "Far Right." Foes See Waste of Education Union
Funds, WASH. TiMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at Al.
141. See Antonucci, supra note 20; see also Jeff Jacoby, Labor Deceit on Prop. 226,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 1998, at A15.
142. See Ferraro, supra note 107.
143. Both alternate draft CTA budgets expected the union to spend $97,394,400 in the
1998-1999 fiscal year. See California Teachers Association Budget 1998-1999(1) at 5 (on
file with the author); California Teachers Association Budget 1998-1999(2) at 5 (on file
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The sole relevant difference between the two draft CTA budgets was
in their treatment of funds originally budgeted for political expenditures.'
44
The budget prepared with the defeat of Proposition 226 appropriated
$7,081,056 for two political action committees involved in supporting
candidates and legislation.' 45 In contrast, the budget drafted to comply with
the constraints of Proposition 226 did not budget any funding for political
146action committees. However, the "Proposition 226 passes" draft budget
contained a new item called the "Public Policy Center" which was
tentatively scheduled to receive $7,081,056.' 47 The Public Policy Center
was described within the budget as, "engaging in the development of public
policies which foster and promote the Association's mission, goals, and
objectives. In doing so, the Center provides funds.., to engage in
organizational outreach to other interested groups with common goals and
objectives to obtain visibility and coordinated advocacy on educational
issues .... One commentator has suggested that the appropriate
translation of this flowery language would be that the CTA intended to use
this Public Policy Center to engage in politics to develop "public policies"
and to "funnel its members' money to other liberal groups and let them
make the political contributions"' 49 instead of contributing directly to
political campaigns. Because the Public Policy Center would be expending
money on items that did not fall within the statutory definition of a political
"contribution" or "expenditure," Proposition 226 would likely be just as
inapplicable to CTA expenditures on the Center's behalf as Initiative 134
was held to be to general union treasury funds.
It appears that even while spending millions of dollars to oppose
Proposition 226, the CTA successfully prepared to nullify or significantly
minimize Proposition 226's effect. Indeed, under Proposition 226 the CTA
could also have followed the example of the WEA to actually increase its
supply of union dues and representation fees available for political
spending without first obtaining employees' written consent. To do so, the
CTA would merely have needed to create a political committee covered by
Proposition 226 to collect voluntary union member contributions. At the
same time, it would mandate that dues from union members support the
Public Policy Center's "soft" money expenditures.' 50
From this information about the CTA's plans to negate the effects of
prototypical paycheck protection legislation, one can legitimately conclude
with the author).
144. See id.
145. See California Teachers Association Budget 1998-1999(1) at 5 (on file with author).
146. See California Teachers Association Budget 1998-1999(2) at 5 (on file with author).
147. See id.
148. Id. at 28.
149. Jacoby, supra note 141.
150. See Chappell interview, supra note 117.
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that the goals of paycheck protection advocates will be just as frustrated
under a well drafted paycheck protection act as they have been by
Washington unions.
C. Strike Three, You're Out: Paycheck Protection Acts Cannot Succeed
for Practical Reasons
There are four broader practical arguments as to why paycheck
protection legislation, while appealing on its face to those who value
worker liberty, is not the best method by which to secure such liberty.
First, paycheck protection legislation at the state level cannot prevent the
unions from utilizing members' union dues and non-members
representation fees to influence federal elections without their consent. 151
The adoption of the guidelines cited above interpreting Initiative 134
by the Washington Attorney General provides insight into the second
reason why legislation that merely attempts to prevent the use of union
dues or representation fees for political expenses without the consent of
employees can never achieve these goals. Under any such paycheck
protection legislation, it is possible that the enforcement mechanism may
be vulnerable to manipulation by labor organizations. This is especially
true where union officials have significant influence either directly or
indirectly over the body selected to enforce the paycheck protection
legislation. For example, one may theorize that the interpretation of RCW
section 42.17.680(3) adopted by the Public Disclosure Commission
("PDC") and the Washington Attorney General, which functionally gutted
Initiative 134's effectiveness, was the result of union officials potentially
having a disproportionate amount of influence in Washington's political
environment. Under the PDC's interpretation of the reach and intent of
RCW section 42.17.680(3), unions will no longer even have to deal with
the procedural inconveniences incurred by the WEA in its attempt to
circumvent Initiative 134. Indeed, Washington unions will be free to spend
general treasury funds on political expenditures without obtaining written
consent for the expenditures from their members. The Washington
government's interpretation and planned limited enforcement of RCW
42.17.680(3) could result in effectively repealing much of Initiative 134
sub silentio. The third practical problem facing paycheck protection
legislation is that enforcement would involve the costs and problems
identified by Justice Black in his dissent in Street.
5 2
151. In 1974 the Federal Election Campaign Act was amended to add section 453, a
broad preemption provision to prevent state law from entering the arena of elections to
federal office. See 2 U.S.C. § 453 (1994).
152. Part of Justice Black's dissent in Street argued that the partial refund formula
adopted by the Street majority would be too unwieldy to effectively protect dissenting
2000]
834 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 2:4
The fourth and most important reason why paycheck protection acts
are not the most effective method for achieving the goals of their advocates
is that they can confuse dissenting employees into thinking that they are
entitled to less of a reduction in union dues or representation fees than the
reduction required under Street, Beck, and their progeny. This is especially
true if one remembers that paycheck protection acts usually focus
exclusively on preventing the expenditure of union dues and representation
fees for political purposes without the employee's consent. 153  The
Ellis/Lehnert and Beck line of cases, however, allow dissenting employees
to refuse to provide financial support to all union expenditures that are
unrelated to collective bargaining regardless of whether they are political
expenditures or not.' 4 Because the judicial precedent allows dissenting
employees to refuse to provide financial support for some nonpolitical but
non-collective bargaining union expenditures, it is almost certain that
refunds claimed under Beck will exceed those available under the
prototypical paycheck protection act. The enactment of paycheck
protection acts will therefore provide a plausible basis for unscrupulous
union representatives to confuse workers attempting to assert Beck rights
into settling for only that portion of the Beck remedy covered by the
paycheck protection act.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear now that after almost thirty years of judicial and legislative
attempts to regulate the negative effects of compulsory unionism's "forced
ridership" upon workers' First Amendment rights, the current reality
remains bleak for the employee who does not wish to financially subsidize
his or her union's political views. Proponents of paycheck protection acts
employees' First Amendment rights. Justice Black's dissent stated:
It may be that courts and lawyers with sufficient skill in accounting, algebra,
geometry, trigonometry and calculus will be able to extract the proper
microscopic answer from the voluminous and complex accounting records of
the local, national, and international unions involved. It seems to me, however,
that while the Court's remedy may prove very lucrative to special masters,
accountants and lawyers, this formula, with its attendant trial burdens, promises
little hope for financial recompense to the individual workers whose First
Amendment freedoms have been flagrantly violated.
Undoubtedly, at the conclusion of this long exploration of accounting
intricacies, many courts could with plausibility dismiss the workers' claims as
de minimis when measured only in dollars and cents.
International Ass'n of Machinists, et al. v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 795-96 (1961) (J. Black,
dissenting).
153. See sources cited supra note 97.
154. See sources cited supra notes 76, 84-87.
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may sincerely believe that they have finally found an effective method to
guarantee workers their full First Amendment privileges by creating an
"opt in" system in place of the Supreme Court's "opt out" system. Sadly,
they are mistaken in their beliefs.
In contrast, union officials are willing to play along with paycheck
proponents' theory of how such acts will affect union political spending.
Cynically perceived, this behavior by union officials may be an attempt to
energize the militant wings of the union. Those same union officials are
well aware that such paycheck protection acts are at most a minor
inconvenience to active union financial involvement in domestic politics.
Overall, the empirical evidence from Washington and California
demonstrates that paycheck protection acts frequently do not succeed in
achieving their goals. Moreover, significant practical arguments indicate
why paycheck protection acts are not necessarily the best method of
maximizing worker control over their paychecks when it comes to union
political spending. Together, the empirical results and practical realities
above leads to the inevitable conclusion that paycheck protection advocates
would do more to assist workers by supporting litigation enforcing the
entire Beck decision instead of merely attempting to protect workers with
ineffective paycheck protection acts.
If, however, a legislative route is sought, the only practical and
principled solution would be to deprive union officials of their legislatively
granted power to compel the payment of any dues as a condition of
employment. Such an approach would eliminate compulsory unionism and
therefore the need to implement demonstrably ineffective government
schemes to regulate the negative effects of compulsory unionism while
retaining the full availability of truly volunteer unionism. Indeed, twenty-
one states have followed this approach under section 14(b) of the NLRA by
enacting "right to work" laws.155 These states have seen not only the
elimination of the need to regulate the negative effects of compulsory
unionism but have also seen significant economic growth in both the
number of jobs and faster increases in personal income than states that have
not exercised their rights under section 14(b) of the NLRA. 156
155. See National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Right to Work States, 1999
(visited Mar. 14, 2000) <http://www.nrtw.orgtrtws.htm> (stating that the following 21 states
have "right to work" laws: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming).
156. See David Kendrick, National Institute for Labor Relations Research, Right to Work
States Continue Tradition of Economic Growth (visited Nov. 4, 1999)
<http://www.nilrr.org/growth.htm> (providing statistics from the U.S. Dept. of Labor
comparing economic growth in "right to work" and "non-right to work" states).
20001
